in Europe: the Western-Catholic-Roman and the Eastern-OrthodoxByzantine. Only the former provided the basis for a culture characterized by a degree of universality-that of Western Europe. A people converted to Catholicism became an equal member of a large family united by a common cultural language and an understanding of the need to learn from the works of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Each people had an opportunity to learn from the ancient model and to make its own contribution to the development of this common culture. Originally the leadership was exercised by the clergy, which was interested in learning and was motivated by the idea of ora et labora; this brought the church closer to the people and raised their cultural level. The acceptance of Roman Law and the rise of autonomous cities (for example, the Magdeburg Law) created the basis for coexistence and the later emergence of the third estate in addition to the clergy and nobility. Concessions obtained by the nobility led ultimately to the development of the constitutional order. The wars of investiture, on the one hand, preserved the independence of the church from the state and, on the other hand, led to the churches' acquiring a national character. Humanism and the Reformation secularized culture and promoted the development of popular literary languages along with the progress in the exact sciences and geographical discoveries. These developments in their ultimate form came to constitute Western culture, which is based upon individual freedom.
Byzantium knew but one universality: the idea of a single ruler of the Rhomaioi and of all Christians-the Byzantine emperor. It viewed the world as divided into Rhomaioi and "barbarians." The Orthodox Church, being dependent upon secular authority, concerned itself with the salvation of individual souls; ora et labora was replaced by the anchorite and hermit. The monastic communities did not become centers of learning in the full sense. The Slavs who accepted Christianity from Byzantium never participated fully in the high Byzantine culture, for they were regarded as inferior and their cultural development was largely limited to the sphere of the monastic communities. For the Slavs there was prepared a translation of selected religious texts in the Slavic ("Church-Slavonic") language-a language not possessing a literary tradition and often not capable of conveying the subtleties of higher learning and secular culture. ' Although the classical Greek traditions persisted in Byzantium, the Slavs, especially the Eastern Slavs, derived little benefit from this fact for the reasons discussed above. As the Eastern Slavic languages developed, Church Slavonic-the sole source of culture-became less and less comprehensible. The Reformation-as a reaction-was possible only in a Catholic milieu; conditions in the Orthodox world were not condu-cive to the secularization of culture. Thus it is not surprising that Marxism remained a body of social and political theory in the West, while in Russian Leninism it assumed the form of a quasi religion.
Does the Ukraine belong to the East or the West? At the time of the emergence of Western culture, between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ukraine, though of the Orthodox faith,2 constituted a component of states of the West European type. The Galician-Volhynian King Danylo sought a union of the two churches and received his crown from a papal legate in 1253. Earlier, in 1245, the Kiev metropolitan, Peter Akerovych, went to Lyons and concluded a Union with the Church of Rome. The Galician-Volhynian state employed Latin in its official documents. With the demise of the dynasty (1340) part of the Ukrainian lands came under the Hungarian state and later under the Polish state; part joined the Lithuanian state, which originally (1386) entered into a real union with Poland, which later (1569) became a personal union.
The various cultural achievements of the West did reach the Ukraine, though with some delay or without the possibility of full development. Humanism, the Reformation, and the Counter Reformation all left their mark in the Ukraine. Thus the Reformationist Mykhailo Vasylevych (1556-61) and the Unitarians Symeon Budny (1562) and Vasyl Tiapynsky translated parts of the Scriptures into the living Ukrainian language of their time. That Church Slavonic was not replaced by the Ukrainian language for another two centuries was due in no small part to the authority of the apologist for Orthodoxy, the anchorite from Athos, Ivan Vyshensky.4 It is well known that the 2 In this context mention should be made of the cult of St. Clement, Pope of Rome, in Kiev. He was the patron of the Kiev Cathedral, the Tithe Church of the Virgin, built by Volodymyr the Great. In his honor there was compiled a book of miracles, TIyao (two known versions date from the twelfth century). Mnaxaijio rpymeBeliCrni, Icmopii yicpa'Ncbo,i Izmepamypu, III (Kiev and Lviv, 1923), 105-9. When in 1147, as a result of political tension between Kiev and Byzantium, the question arose as to how to obtain a new metropolitan, the Bishop of Chernyhiv, Onufrii, offered an interesting solution. He proved that just as the patriarch of Constantinople in consecration employs the sacred relic of the hand of St. John, so in Kiev a metropolitan could be consecrated with the reliquary of Pope Clement. It is significant that when this method was approved by all six bishops of Southern Rus' (the present Ukrainian territory) the Kiev Orthodox Metropolitan Klym Smoliatych (<<1aHHnIHni H (DHJIOCOJ1, TaiK suKome B PYCLSOR BeBUJIH He 6HimeTM>>-Hypatian Chronicle, s.a. 1147) was consecrated by means of the pope's reliquary. The bishops of Northern Rus', under the leadership of Nifont (who effected the Novgorod separatism discussed elsewhere) refused to recognize the validity of this method. Kiev metropolitan, Peter Mohyla (1596-1647), introduced the study of Latin in the College founded by him as a means of combating the Jesuit Counter Reformation. The distinctive Ukrainian baroque in architecture, literature, and the arts also testifies to a unity with the West.5
The tragedy of the Ukrainians is that since the fifteenth century their territory has been a "borderland" between East and West, incapable of committing itself entirely to either side and denied a free choice because it has been coveted by both.6 Yet, if the Ukrainian nation exists to this day, it is not only because of the linguistic differences between Russian and Ukrainian but mainly because of a distinctive cultural tradition.
"NONHISTORICAL"
OR "INCOMPLETE" NATIONHOOD?
Rudnytsky's use of the term "nonhistorical" with reference to the Ukrainian nation in the nineteenth century is not entirely accurate.
The Ukrainian national rebirth began in the latter part of the eighteenth century among the Left Bank gentry descended from the officer class of the former hetmanate. It is from this milieu that the Istoriia Rusov emerged to demonstrate that the rupture in historical continuity was far from complete. The Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century, instead of being "nonhistorical," can be said to have been "incomplete"7 in terms of the hetmanate state form following the fall of Mazepa (1709). The Ukrainian Cossacks, both the Zaporozhian Host and the "town Cossacks," acquired significance in the second half of the sixteenth century. Originally this was a social or corporate movement without political or religious overtones. The Host acquired a national character during the second decade of the seventeenth century when it intervened, under the leadership of Hetman Peter Sahaidachny (1616-22), in the struggle of the Orthodox Rus' against Catholicism and Church Union in the Polish state. Their crowning achievement in this sphere was the re-establishment in 1620 of the Ukrainian Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdiction, under the Host's military protection, in the persons of IpIHBeAeT.>> HBau BHeHCeuHii, Coutuneunu (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), p. 23.
Significantly, the language used by Vyshensky was far from being Church Slavonic; it was rather the Ukrainian language of that time. As a product of Humanism and the Reformation, philological studies emerged in the Ukraine of the late sixteenth centulry. Two of the most important works should be mentioned here: The Slavenorosskii (Church Slavonic-Ukrainian) dictionary by Pamvo Berynda (Kiev, 1627) and the first grammar ever written of the Church Slavonic language, by Meletius Smotrytsky (Eviu, 1619).
5 AMHTpO 'TUaeBneaRIuIi lczopizi yxpainchol aimepanzypu: Bia nonamsie ao ao6u peali3nty (New York, 1956 ) provides a discussion of the baroque in Ukrainian literature, pp. 248-317. A separate province of Ukrainian literature from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century consists of that written in Latin. For a brief characterization of this literature see ibid., pp. 318-20. 6 This problem is discussed at length in Edtuard Winter, Byzanz und Roim im Kampf urn die Ukraine, 955-1939 955- (Leipzig, 1942 . 7 The definition of "incomplete" nationhood as applied to eighteenth-century literature is discussed in IunCeasusII, op. cit., pp. 322-23. a metropolitan and five bishops consecrated by Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem.8
Ecclesiastical circles soon appreciated the worth of this new ally and began to see in the Host not only defenders of the Orthodox Church but also the direct descendants of the Princely Rus'. However, when the Orthodox hierarchy, under the leadership of Metropolitan Job Boretsky (1620-31), began to develop a plan for an alliance of Orthodox rulers ostensibly directed against the Ottoman Empire but in fact against Poland, they relied not on the strength of the Zaporozhian Host but on the more effective power of an Orthodox ruler-the Muscovite Orthodox tsar. However, the Kiev clergy viewed the tsar from a distance in highly idealized terms.
The Orthodox College established in Kiev in 1632 by Metropolitan Peter Mohyla (later known as the Mohyla-Mazepa Academy) played an important role in raising the educational level, but its membership, with certain exceptions, regarded the issue of Ukrainian statehood with equanimity, once serious political difficulties arose. Like the socialists in the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian elite of the Orthodox Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were interested not in local but in "universal" problems. In order to attract the support of the most powerful Orthodox ruler, the Muscovite tsar, the Kievan Orthodox Church elite manufactured-or at least gave their approval to9-the historic conception of the "transfer" of the princely seats: Kiev-Vladimiron-the-Kliazma-Muscovy. This concept was most precisely formulated in the Synopsis, which was first published in 1670 or 1674 and was reissued in approximately thirty editions and used as a history textbook until the mid-nineteenth century. In this first textbook on East European history no mention was made of the Zaporozhian Host, although the author or authors of the Synopsis had lived under the protection of the Cossack State. Despite its generally apolitical attitude, the Kiev clergy actively collaborated with the revolution led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky which began in 1648. Its success confronted the hetman with numerous problems. Beginning as a Zaporozhian military dictatorship, the enlarged new state required a broader form of government. At this time the representatives of the old elite of Rus' and Lithuania-Rus', the magnates and gentry (both Orthodox and Catholic), came in great numbers to serve the new state.11 Thus emerged the concept of a traditionbased complete state-of the type of a hereditary Rus' principality-with religious tolerance and cooperation between social classes. The nature of this state-unique for its time-was most fully reflected in the Swedish-Ukrainian treaty of 1657 and in related documents.12
However, Khmelnytsky was unable to consummate this effort. During the limited tenure of his rule (1648-57) numerous wars on various fronts compelled the hetman to conclude treaties with his neighbors. One of these treaties, that with Muscovy concluded at Pereiaslav in 1654, proved to be a heavy burden impeding the development of the Cossack State. The Muscovite tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, finding it easier to extend his domain by means of direct negotiations with Poland than by waging war, quickly forgot about the terms of the Pereiaslav Treaty and hastened to conclude a profitable settlement at Vilna (1656), ignoring the Ukrainians and their interests. This occurred because the tsar chose to interpret the quasi-protectorate relationship between himself and Khmelnytsky (stipulated in the text of the Pereiaslav Treaty) as an act of submission by the hetman (see note 34).
After Khmelnytsky's death, Muscovy succeeded in inflaming class and religious differences within the Hetman State and, employing the so-called chern' and part of the Orthodox clergy, provoked a civil conflict-the so-called Ruina (Ruin) between 1663 and 1674. As a result, the aristocracy and gentry, the bearers of the concept of the complete state, were physically liquidated. The re-emergence of a gentry-officer class under Hetman Ivan Samoilovych (1672-87) led to the renewal of the idea of a Rus' principality during the hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa (1687-1709) and to his treaty with Charles XII of Sweden. The defeat at Poltava in 1709 destroyed forever the idea of a Rus' principality.13 The repressive measures of Peter I led to the decline of all independent political thought. There emerged the notion of a modus vivendi in 11 See W. Lipin'ski, Z dziejoiw Ukrainy (Kiev, 1912) and also BR-qecIaB JlInnIeHMlKsII, Ywpa,Na na nepezoxti, 1657-1659 (Vienna, 1920 which an incomplete "Little Russian" state wvould exist as an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. The plight of the Ukraine lay not so much in the fact of the destruction of the Hetmanate State and the Zaporozhian order (historical discontinuity) as in the fact that after 1709 the use of harsh and repressive measures by Peter I and the emergence of Russian imperialist centralism caused the concept of a conmplete Ukrainian Cossack State to be replaced by a Cossack class autonomy which could be defined as an incomplete state. Under these circumstances the granting to the Ukrainian Cossack officer class of rights equal to those of the "AllRussian nobility" in 1835 was a way of satisfying, to a certain degree, the needs of this "incomplete" nation.
The ideas of romanticism, democracy, and socialism reached the Ukraine and influenced the gentry youth. However, not having inherited from their parents the national and political ideas of a "complete nation," they limited their efforts to enlightening the local peasants or were attracted to democratic or socialist movements on the imperial level. The so-called Ukrainophiles and khlopomany are of particular interest. They viewed the nationality question in class terms, identifying their gentry status with the Russian (or Polish) nation; by associating themselves with the serfs they were severing their old ties as identified in terms of class and nation. However, their ideal was not nationalization of the gentry but their own individual "democratization."14 Despite their dedication and their love for the Ukrainian people, the "Ukrainophiles" perpetuated the concept of the "incomplete" Ukrainian nation. During the second half of the nineteenth century the Ukrainian populist movement was taken over from the gentry by persons from other classes, the intellectuals or so-called "conscious Ukrainians." However, this group unconsciously followed in the footsteps of the gentry and also preserved the "incomplete" nation. The socialist element devoted its energies to opposing the Ukrainization of the nobility and the emerging bourgeoisie and in this way hindered the process of advancing the Ukrainian nation to a state of "completeness."
SEPARATISM
The term "separatism" in the sense of a cultural-political secession of a part of the territory of ancient Rus' is frequently associated by publicists and even by specialists in East European history with the Ukrainian movement of the nineteenth century. In actual fact separatism in Eastern Europe commenced much earlier-and in the north.
Great Novgorod and Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma departed from the Kievan model to such a degree that they can be said to have set a sep-arate course for themselves early in the twelfth century. Novgorod became wealthy as a result of its intermediary role in east-west trade and soon found a common language with the other centers of Baltic commerce. The German Hansa, which was emerging at this time, was closer to Novgorod than was "continental" Kiev after the decline of the trade route "from the Varangians to the Greeks." In 1136 Novgorodunder the ideological leadership of Bishop Nifont (1 130-56)-dethroned Prince Vsevolod Mstislavich, sent from Kiev, and laid the groundwork for the unique (in Eastern Europe) republican system of "Great Lord Novgorod" and of "Saint Sophia." Authority now reposed in the representatives of the commercial aristocracy, in the veche. The veche elected the bishop (vladyka), who, as head of the "Council of Lords," became the de facto head of the state; it also elected the executive in the persons of the mayor (posadnik), the head of the town militia (tysiatsky), and the prince, who was now in fact only a military commander. Great Novgorod demonstrated its independence by establishing its own svod or revised collection of chronicles, the Sofiiskii vremennik. The other attribute of independence in the Rus' of that time-a separate metropolitanate-was not acquired, but the vladyka did obtain the title of Archbishop in 1 165. '5 As a result of being located very advantageously on trade routes far removed from the chronic danger presented by Turkic nomads, the colonial part of ancient Rus'-the Vladimir-Suzdal territory-flourished during the second half of the eleventh and first half of the twelfth century. The cities and population grew, and the conditions of a colonial way of life were conducive to the strengthening of princely authority. In place of the Kievan system of a veche and a class of boyars, there arose a system of rule based upon a military service class derived from various lands and classes and loyal to the prince.
It was Andrei Bogoliubsky (1157-74) who effected the separatism of the Vladimir-Suzdal territories. Andrei's father, Iurii Monomakhovich, still recognized the primacy of Kiev in Rus'; and when, after various attempts in 1149 and 1150, he finally obtained the throne of Kiev in 1155, Andrei as his son obtained the Kievan Vyshhorod in accordance with the traditional system. However, Andrei fled from Vyshhorod to the North that same year, without his father's knowledge, in order to take over the Vladimir-Suzdal territories within two years. After the death of the father, Andrei refused to reign in Kiev. This demonstrative act was the first manifestation of a reappraisal of values in Kievan Rus'16 and was soon to be reinforced by another act. The Polovetsian hatred for Kiev and its cultural worth prompted Andrei-Kitai (Andrei Bogoliubsky's mother was a Polovetsian, and in addition to his Christian name of Andrei he had the Polovetsian name of Kitai)j7 to plunder and ruin Kiev in 1169, employing these barbarous means to cause this older center to lose its attraction. Thus, the Vladimir-Alluscovy period of East European history began not with the acceptance of the Kiev tradition but with its negation and destruction. In order to separate his territories from Kiev Andrei attempted to obtain from Byzantium approval for the establishment of a separate metropolitanate in Vladimir, but these efforts met with failure.
However, the other attribute of sovereignty-a separate svod of chronicles-was achieved by Andrei's successor, Vsevolod (1176-1212) in 1177. In this revised chronicle, preserved in the Laurentian Chronicle of 1377, the Kievan tradition is accepted only up to the time of Vladimir Monomakh (1113), that is, up to this formative period of the Vladimir-Suzdal dynasty.,, The northern chronicles came to reflect a declining interest in southern affairs, and after the ruination of Kiev by the Tatars in 1240 the fate of the southern Rus', especially the GalicianVolhynian state, receives no mention. This silence was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the northern Rus' and southern Rus' remained within the same ecclesiastical jurisdiction, that of the metropolitan of "Kiev and all Rus'" and, in addition, were subordinated to the same political order-that of the Golden Horde, which had a highly developed postal system. Thus, it was not Mongol domination which separated the northern Rus' from the southern Rus' but rather the lack of any sense of community and the absence of mutual attraction and interest. The attempt to lay claim to the Kiev tradition manifested itself in Muscovy only in modern times under the influence of the imperialist political design.
In contrast, it should be noted that the attitude in the southern Rus' toward Kiev and its tradition was very different. When Roman of Volhynia acquired Galicia in 1199 he became the most powerful ruler in southern Rus', and it is not without reason that the contemporary chronicler termed him the "autocrat of all Rus'." However, neither Roman nor his successors inflicted ruination upon Kiev. Roman accepted the entire Kiev tradition. The Hypatian Chronicle, which transmitted the Galician-Volhynian svody (the last of which was edited in 1289), preserved in its entirety the Kiev svod of the twelfth century (to 1198).
The entire question of the relations between the northern and south- ern Rus' might be better understood in terms of a geographic analogy and a historical model. Let us assume for a moment that the southern mother Rus' territory (the present Ukrainian territory) was divided from the northern colonial territory of Rus' (the present Russian territory) by a sea in the same way that the mother country England was divided from the colony of New England by the Atlantic Ocean. Let us further assume that George Washington, after having proclaimed the independence of the colonies, had plundered and ruined London (as Andrei Bogoliubsky had sacked Kiev in 1169), and that five centuries later the head of the renewed state of the mother country had concluded a quasi-protectorate agreement with the head of the United States government. Let us also assume that the United States interpreted this quasi protectorate as an act of submission and as a perpetual union of the two "English" countries in a manner analogous to that which occurred in Eastern Europe after the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654. Let us in addition assume that the Americans now imposed an official politico-historical concept regarding the transfer of the state center in accordance with the scheme: London-Boston-Philadelphia-Washington, D.C. (in a manner analogous to the official Russian scheme: KievVladimir-on-the-Kliazma-Moscow-St. Petersburg). Let us in conclusion assume that, relying on the fact that English colonists came and settled in the United States before and after it declared its independence, American political leaders officially proclaimed the entire culture and history of England prior to American independence to be the first period of American history and culture; Englishmen in the mother country are permitted to begin their history and culture approximately two centuries after the proclamation of American independence.19 Under these hypothetical but analogous circumstances if English historians (England has now become Britain just as southern Rus' has become Ukraina) were bold enough to treat the history of EnglandBritain as a single whole commencing with the beginnings of English history and culture (Beowulf, Chaucer, Shakespeare)-which the Americans had now appropriated-such historians would be officially branded as "nationalists"20 and would be imprisoned or exiled. To complete the 19 According to official Soviet historiography the Ukrainian nation and its culture are said to have begun in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Prerevolutionary Russian historiography was based firmly on the assumption of the transfer of centers, and consequently had no place for the history of the Ukraine except to associate it with separatism in the modern period. Beginning with the 3amenanu no no6o0y ioncnewina yite6kuca no ucmopuu CCCP H1. Cmauuna, A. Mhanoaa u C. Iupoea (Moscow, 1937 ) the following scheme has been dominant: prior to the thirteenth century there existed a common Old-Russian rnation (sic), which during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries developed into three East European nations-the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian-but for the period prior to the fourteenth century the terms "Old Russian" or "Russian" are used interchangeably, and this period is in fact appropriated for the Russian nation by official Soviet historiography. Research on this early period is centered in Moscow and Leningrad. Studies published in the Ukraine are permitted to deal with this early period only in a cursory manner. 20 A curious practice is occasionally encountered in the works of certain American analogy, any political movement which would attempt to liberate Britain from foreign occupation would be denounced as "separatist."
REUNION?
Histories of Eastern Europe have reflected a particular methodology. The linguistic term "Old (or "common") Russian language" (drevnerusskii iazyk, used for "Old Eastern Slavonic")-which is as much of a linguistic abstraction as a "common West Slavic language," a "common Indo-European language," and the like-has frequently been adopted by historians as a historical datum for the purpose of defining the first stage of the so-called "Old Russian nationality" (drevnerusskaia narodnost'). 21 By way of contrast, no historian of Poland or of the Czech lands commences his history with the period of "common West Slavic linguistic unity." Nor do these historians write of a common culture of a hypothetical "common West Slavic nationality" but rather of separate Polish and Czech cultures. However, the term "Old (or "common") Russian culture" is used in spite of the fact that the cultural "unity" of the Russian and Ukrainian lands between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries was not different from that of the Poland and Bohemia (Czech lands) of that period. This cultural "unity" was based on the fact that the Ukraine (in its modern sense), like Bohemia, was the donor, while Muscovy, like Poland, was the recipient. Poland received Christianity from Bohemia just as the Kiev missionary, Saint Kuksha, was converting the Viatichi-ancestors of the present Russians-in the second half of the eleventh century and was martyred by them.22 The eastern counterspecialists on the history of Eastern Europe. In bibliographic annotations a double standard is sometimes evident: tendentious works of Russian and other historians are frequently cited without any qualifying adjectives, while Hrushevsky is referred to as a "nationalist" because he dared to demonstrate the incorrectness of the concept of the "transfer" of centers. In actual fact Hrushevsky was, in his politics, not a "nationalist" but a socialist and a leader of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party. Clearly, if the adjective "nationalist" is to be employed it should be on the basis of the same standard. In accepting unquestionably the terminology of official Soviet Russian historiography, American scholars should know that the Soviet use of the epithet "nationalist" does not correspond to the Western meaning of the same term, since a former member of the Central Commnittee of the CPSU can also be branded as a "nationalist" if his viewpoint should conflict with the current general line of the party. 21 See, for example, the chapter on the emergence of the "Old Russian nationality" in Ottepizu uCmnopuu CCCP: flepuoa 3GeoaaAu3xta IX-XVr 66., I (Moscow, 1953), 251-58. It is worth noting that in this chapter, as in other works of this character, the terms "Old Russian" (meaning "Old Rus'") and "Russian" are used synonymously. In this context one is prompted to ask if it is not time that American historians of Eastern Europe abandon the terminology used by Russians (for reasons of their own) and employ one that is strictly objective. For example, the term "Kievan Russia" connotes a nonexistent relationship of Kiev with a Russia which emerged several centuries later; obviously the accurate term is "Kievan Rus'," since Rus' is not identical with Russia.
part of Latin as the cultural (foreign) language of the Western Slavs was the alien Church Slavonic language. Similarly, the ancient Russian literary language of Muscovy and its literature developed under the influence of the literary language and literature of the Ukrainian lands (Kiev, Chernyhiv, Halych) in the same way that the Polish literary language emerged as a result of Czech influence. The East Slavic-West Slavic parallel should be qualified to the extent that in the Ukrainian and Russian lands there were two branches of a single dynasty, while Bohemia and Poland had their own dynasties-although at times these dynasties were united in marriage. Thus on occasion both countries were ruled by the same king (for example, Boleslaw I of Poland, Wenceslaus II of Bohemia). Poland also acquired its own archbishopric in the year 1000, just as the Vladimir-Suzdal lands, after their separation, endeavored to obtain their own metropolitanate (which occurred only at the end of the thirteenth century which could have later served as the basis for the emergence of an "old (or "common") Russian nationality." Similarly, if the nations of Western Europe had not yet emerged in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, why should an "old (or "common") Russian nationality" have existed at that time? Indeed, is it not, at long last, time to identify this anachronism as the legend that it is and lay it to rest? During the course of more than four centuries from 1240 to 1654, the ancestors of the Russians and Ukrainians lived in different states and in entirely different cultural spheres. Before 1620 there were no significant regular contacts between cultural representatives of the two peoples.25 In 1954, as part of the Soviet tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Treaty, there occurred in the Soviet Union a reaffirmation of the political thesis regarding the "eternal oneness" of the Rutssian and Ukrainian peoples based on the legendary common "Old Russian nationality" of the eleventh and twelfth centuries discussed above.26 Thus the 1654 treaty was interpreted as a "reunion" of the Ukrainian and Russian "fraternal peoples" by applying to an event of the seventeenth century populist ideas which emerged under the influence of nineteenthcentury romanticism. In actual fact the Pereiaslav Treaty, like all other treaties of that time, was between two rulers or two states and not between two peoples. It is evident that "reunion" in 1654 would have had to be preceded by a previous act of union of which, as we have indicated, there is no record.
Let us turn to this meeting of Russians and Ukrainians in 1654.27 Let us commence with the alleged feeling of oneness. For the Russians of that time the Ukrainians were foreigners or inozemtsy (I, 318), "Cherkas-foreigners" (I, 463), "foreigners of the Lithuanian lands" or 25 It is for this reason that in the Pereiaslav Tercentenary edition of selected documenits none is dated prior to 1620. See note 27. 26 It is significant that both nations, the Muscovites and the Ukrainians, developed different messianic concepts: while in Muscovy the political "Third Rome" concept emerged, one finds in the Ukraine the Kiev religious concept viewing that city as the "Second Jerusalem." See R. Stupperich, "Kiev-das Zweite Jerusalem," in Zeitschrift fur slavische Philologie, XII, No. 3-4 (1935), 332-54. 27 The collection of selected documents on the "reunion" is: BoccoeauneHue YKpaltubt c Poccueui: jowcyotenmst u xtamepuaAbt 6 mpex mootax (Moscow, 1953); Vol. I (1620-47), 585 pp.; Vol. II (1648-51), 559 pp.; Vol. III (1651-54), 645 pp.
In our discussion of the differences between Muscovy and the Ukraine in the midseventeenth century we have relied almost exclusively upon this official Soviet selection of documents designed to demonstrate the thesis of "reunion." The representative quotations from these documents included in our discussion are not footnoted separately; reference is made in parentheses in the text to specific citations from these volumes. (The title of this collection is hardly accurate in view of the fact that prior to 1654 the term Rosiia was applied to the Ukraine and llot to Muscovy, for which the term Rusiia or "Muscovite state" was used.)
The accounts of foreigners who visited the Ukraine and Muscovy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and who were impressed with the many basic differences between the two nations can be found in B. CimuucBirn, IJyicuiufi npo Yppa(tny (Lviv, 1938) It is common knowledge among specialists that literary intercourse between the Ukraine and Muscovy in the seventeenth century was that of two peoples totally foreign in language and in spirit. Muscovy's low cultural level at that tine led to the persecution of Ukrainian literature and its authors.9
Ukrainian and foreign ecclesiastics as well as the Ukrainian administration in the 1649-54 period regarded the Cossack State as an independent political unit, the equal of the Muscovite State. Thus Sukhanov reported to the tsar on May 9, 1649, that the visiting Orthodox high clergy, the metropolitans of Corinth and Nazareth, "in the prayers for long life and in the litanies pray for the Hetman as Sovereign and as the Hetman of Great Rosiia" (II, 187). In correspondence between Ukrainian and Russian authorities in the 1649-53 period it is clear that the Ukrainians assumed complete equality between Muscovy and the Ukraine. Thus the form of titling the hetman was the same as that of titling the Muscovite tsar-both were referred to as "By the Grace of God Great Sovereign."30 Trade between Muscovy and the Ukraine was attributed to the fact of consent by both rulers-"your tsar and our Bohdan Khmelnytsky Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host."3' When the Muscovite frontier authorities in 1651 addressed correspondence to Polish officials in the Ukraine in accordance with previous practice, they were informed that the Polish officials had fled three years before and that correspondence should be addressed to the Ukrainian authorities if they wished to have friendly relations (III, 25-26). In dealing with frontier incidents the Ukrainian local governor refused to act except upon an order from the hetman. 32 The Although Sweden was in conflict with Muscovy, the Muscovite tsar did not protest categorically against the Ukrainian ties with Sweden, and Khmelnytsky did not regard his accepting a Swedish protectorate as being incompatible with a continuation of the tie with Muscovy. Thus, after the Pereiaslav Treaty Khmelnytsky continued to conduct his own foreign policy, which was based on the establishment of good relations with all neighboring states except Poland. This meant that he had to enter into a (quasi-) protectorate relationship with each of these neighboring rulers. At the end of his life Khmelnytsky was simultaneously a quasi-protected ruler of three sovereigns-the Ottoman Porte, Muscovy, and Sweden-who were engaged in mutual conflict. 33 Khmelnytsky was reared in the Polish-Lithuanian gentry-democracy in which the bilateral acts of ruler and subjects and such political institutions as the personal and real union, protectorate, and the like were rooted in tradition; he also knew, through personal experience, the political practices of the Ottoman Porte. When in 1653 Khmelnytsky required Muscovite military aid, he decided to submit to the "high hand of the Orthodox tsar" of Muscovy.34 Howvever, despotic Muscovy, representing a very different tradition, could not comprehend any con- 33 In June, 1657, Hetman Khmelnytsky insisted upon maintaining the tie with Sweden, in a statement made to the Muscovite envoy Buturlin, in the following terms: "I will never sever my ties wvith the Swedish king because our alliance, friendship, and understanding are of long duration having commenced more than six years ago before our subjection to the high hand of the tsar"; Agxnb, omnoC.ou(ieca Kx ucmopiu IOmctou it 3anawlou Pocciu, III (St. Petersburg, 1861), 568.
In April, 1657, the Ukrainian envoy to the Ottoman Porte, Lavryn Kapusta, presented a diplomatic note in which the sultan wvas addressed as "our higlhest lord" (do rintinu nostrum supremuin) and in wvhich emphasis w-vas placed on "testifying to our0 old friencdship, sincere fidelity and service" (ut nostram antiquan imnicitiam ac sinceram ficlelitatemin ac seirvitia erega cani cdemeZ Por-tam declararemuis) Apxuo-,l Ofzo-3ana&Aot Pocciu. Part III, Vol.
VI (Kiev, 1908), 216-17. 34 There is a vast literature dealing with the nature of the Pereiaslav Treaty, discussed in FpymeBCaeuii, Icno piq Ywpa0tu-Pycu, IX, Part II (Kiev, 1931), 865-69; H. Fleischlacker, "Aleksej Michajlovic und Bogdain Chmel'nickij," in Jalt rbficher fiur Kultur utndc Gesclhichte tractual relationship between the tsar and his subjects.35 Muscovy knew only a unilateral submission to the tsar, and Khmelnytsky could not conceive of such a relationship. For this reason the ceremonial aspects of the establishment of this treaty relationship commenced very dramatically on January 8, 1654. Khmelnytsky was dumfounded by the statement of the Muscovite envoy Buturlin, who refused to take the oath on behalf of the tsar and declared that in Muscovite practice it was unthinkable that a subject could demand an oath from the tsar. Khmelnytsky refused to take the oath and walked out of the church in Pereiaslav in which the ceremony was to take place (III, 464-66, and note 38 infra). Various interpretations have been offered: personal union, real union, protectorate, quasi protectorate, vassalage, military alliance, autonomy, incorporation. In our opinion the Pereiaslav Treaty, which was a result of lengthy negotiations between two signatories having different systems, cannot be subsumed under a single category. In view of our discussion it is reasonable to conclude that in substance, from Khmelnytsky's point of view, it was a military alliance (Hetman Orlyk termed the Pereiaslav Treaty implicitly "le Traite d'Alliance," see the end of this note) like others he had with the Ottoman sultan and the king of Sweden. In a formal sense the Pereiaslav Treaty had as well elements of a personal union and of a quasi protectorate. It can be regarded as a personal union, since the treaty had been concluded with the tsar (and there were no common institutions apart from the person of the tsar) and because of the preservation of a separate Cossack State and its continuing to be a subject of international law capable of imposing tariffs.
There is also a basis for regarding the Pereiaslav Treaty as a quasi protectorate in view of the following considerations: Since the tsar as an absolute monarch identified his person with the state, the Pereiaslav Treaty was not only an agreement between two rulers but was also a treaty between two states. This is also evident in the fact that in addition to Khmelnytsky, the Zaporozhian Host appeared as an official treaty partner whom Hetman Orlyk described as "les ltats de l'Ukraine" (see end of note). If it were only a personal union there would have been no place for a hetman and the tsar could have assumed the title of hetmani. Instead, Khmelnytsky remained as hetman and was empowered to conduct foreign relations (having full competence with certain precisely defined limitations); had Pereiaslav established a complete protectorate (as contrasted with a quasi protectorate), the hetman would not have had the right to conduct foreign relations. In addition, the Ukraine preserved her full state apparatus after 1654, and the Muscovite troops stationed in the Ukraine were circumscribed in their rights in the same way that American troops stationed in Western Europe under NATO have been forbidden to intervene in the internal affairs of the host country.
The duration of the treaty had been determined as voveki; in the Russian language of the seventeenth century this word did not have the meaning "eternity" but "perpetual" in the sense "for life," for example, in a document of 1641 the word voveki is explained by means of do smizerti zhivota svoego ("to the end of his life"; I, 318). Therefore, each of Khinielnytsky's successors was supposed to renew the treaty. After the conclusion of the treaty, on March 21-27, 1654, a joint military campaign was undertaken against Poland. Both armies operated in White Ruthenia but independently of each other. Thus began the strange phenomenon of "a battle of two Rus' for the third."36 The Ukrainian Cossack Army, in response to the request of the local population of White Ruthenia, introduced the Cossack system establishing a White Ruthenian military-governmental region (polk). The Ukrainian army attempted to outmaneuver the Muscovite army in taking White Ruthenian territory under its protection, and this even led to armed clashes between the two "allies."
All of the documentary evidence makes it perfectly clear that Khmelnytsky's relations with Muscovy were rationalized not by any sense of common national, linguistic, or other ties but only by the fact of a common religious faith. Nowhere in the Pereiaslav documents is there any reference to "reunion" or to dynastic claims of the Muscovite tsars to the Ukrainian lands. It should also be borne in mind that the various Eastern Slavic branches of the Orthodox Church of that time had developed their distinctive characteristics, even though all, including the non-Slavic Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia, used the Church Slavonic language. As a result, the dialectic manifested itself here as well: thus the Kiev Orthodox ecclesiastical leadership, which between 1620 and 1648 had been interested in obtaining support from the Muscovite Orthodox tsar for an Orthodox alliance, categorically refused-in the person of the Kiev metropolitan, Sylvester Kosov -to take an oath to the tsar apart from that of Khmelnytsky (III, 481 We, All of the Zaporozhian Host, do declare and testify (Nos Universus Exercituts Zaporovianuts noturm testatumnque facimus) before God and the entire world.... Our Host, having received promises and obligations from the Grand Prince of Muscovy and having expected-because of a common religion and having voluntarily accepted protection-that the Grand Prince would be just, sympathetic and generous towards us; that he would act honestly, that he would not persist in the destruction of our liberties but would actually enhance them in accordance with his promises. But our hopes were not to be fulfilled. .. In Kiev, our capital (in civitate nostra principali Kioviensi), this was not the case even during Polish rule-a fortress has been built and a Muscovite garrison stationed there in order to place us in bondage. We have seen examples of such bondage in White Ruthenia where two hundred gentry families-though sympathetic to them [the Muscovites]-were forcibly deported to Muscovy; 12,000 free men from the MVohyliv and other parts of White Ruthenia were deported to the forests of Muscovy and in their places were brought Muscovite colonists.... Following the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of eternal memory, Muscovy determined to ruin the entire Little and White Rus'. Upon the election of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky Muscovy introduced dissension among us, planting rumors that the Hetman is a Pole and favors Poland more than the Zaporozhian Host.... The [Muscovite] commander Romodanovsky, under the pretext of maintaining order, intervened in our internal affairs: he had the audacity to distribute the Hetman's titles and insignia, replacing [Ukrainian] military governors, instigating subjects against the Hetman and destroying cities which supported their own Hetman.... In this way there has been revealed the cunning and deception of those who-first with the aid of our civil war (nostro interno et civili bello) and later openly turning their weapons against us (without any provocation on our part)-are preparing 38 Although the text of Buturlin's account to the tsar (in the form in which it is available) does not refer to any official promises made to Khmelnytsky on behalf of the tsar in place of the oath which the hetman wanted Buturlin to take, it is apparent that such promises were made. Gizel's petition addressed to the tsar in connection with the Pereiaslav Treaty, written but six months after the conclusion of the treaty, emphasizes in two separate passages official promises made to Khmelnytsky by Buturlin on behalf of the tsar. <<O ceMs HpeWRe B1 lTepeHCefaBJI reTreaHy Bamero aapCKoro BeJIHqeCTBa aanopoaxcizoxIy 6oRpuHi TBOT It is impossible to question the accuracy of this source.
for us the yoke of bondage. Declaring our innocence and invoking Divine succor, we are compelled in order to preserve our liberties to have recourse to a just defense and seek the aid of our neighbors so as to throw off this yoke. Thus it is not we who are responsible for the war with Muscovy which is everywhere becoming inflamed."39
The first actual meeting of Russians and Ukrainians in 1654 was a meeting of two different worlds, which, in spite of the superficial aspects of a common Orthodox faith, led not to "union" (let alone "reunion") but to chronic misunderstanding and mutual conflict.40
Rus', MALOROSSIIA ("LITTLE RUSSIA"), UKRAINA
The term Rus' (from a grammatical point of view a Slavic collective noun derived from rus; the singular form being rus-in) is derived from the name of the Norman Varangians, who in the middle of the ninth century became soldiers of fortune and, later, rulers of all Eastern Europe. Kiev became the center of their rule, and the Kiev territory came to represent the land of Rus' par excellence. The princes of Rus' in the broadest sense included all lines of the Rus' dynasty (the Riurikovichi), their retinues (druzhina) and territories. After the acceptance of Christianity, the metropolitanate which united all of Western Europe in a single ecclesiastical jurisdiction was termed "of all Rus'" (7r uqg 'Povta3). Since the metropolitan was usually a Byzantine Greek, an agent and guardian of the idea of the universal rule of the Byzantine emperor and his interests, the political concept of a single complete Rus' state did not emerge in the Kiev period. 41 The sole unity which Rus' possessed at that time was limited to the metropolitanate "of Kiev and of all Rus'." 39 ApXu6 I0to-3anaaoil Pocciu, Part III, Vol. VI (Kiev, 1908), 362-69. See also the statement made by Hetman I. Mazepa (1708) in which he announced his decision to annul the treaty with Peter I (as is known, in the Muscovite-Russian interpretation this act of annulment was regarded as "treason"-izmena): "I had decided to write a letter of thanks to his tsarist highness (Peter I) for the protection [protektsiu] , and to list in it all the insults to us, past and present, the loss of rights and liberties, the ultimate ruin and destruction being prepared for the whole nation, and, finally, to state that we had bowed under the high hand of his tsarist highness as a free people for the sake of the onze Eastern. Orthodox Faith. Now, being a free people, we are freely departing, and we thank his tsarist highness for this protection. We do not want to extend our hand and spill Christianl blood, buit we will await our complete liberation under the protection of the Swedish King." <lIuC3io Op.iua HL CT. lBopCIHoMry>> in Ocuoca, JIuCTOnIaA, 1862, p. 15. 40 A similar conclusion has been drawn by Kliuchevsky: "Not comprehending each other and not trusting each other, both sides in their mutual relationship did not say what they thought and did what they did not wish to do.... Therefore, the Little Russian The process of creating a political concept of the state related to the name Rus' began only in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when on the peripheries of the Rus' territories there emerged two states: the Regnurm (Ducat us) Russiae (the Galician-Volhynian State) and the Great Muscovite Principality. The rulers of the latter, beginning with Ivan Kalita (1325-41), titled themselves Princes "of all Rus'" (since Ivan the Terrible: vseia Rusii "of all Rusiia") imitating the metropolitan's title. Before the reign of Peter I both in the East and in the West the term "Rus'" (Russi, Rutheni; Russia, Ruthenia, ar-Rus, etc.) was customarily applied to the present Ukrainian territory and its inhabitants; for what is today known as the center of Russia proper the term "Muscovy" was employed.
The term Malorossiia ("Little Russia") was of Greek origin (1 ,MKpa 'Porita; in Latin, Russia Mynor). The term was employed by the Byzantine Patriarch to identify the second Rus' metropolitanate established in 1303 at the insistence of the Galician-Volhynian rulers in response to the decision of the then metropolitan of Kiev "and of all Rus'," the Greek Maxim, to take up residence in Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma in 1299. In adopting the title of metropolitan, the rulers of the GalicianX7olhynian State called themselves the rulers of "all Minor Rus'" as, for example, Boleslav-Iurii II: "Dei gracia natus dux tocius Russie Mynoris";42 in the same way the princes of Muscovy claimed to be rulers "of all Rus'."
It is important to note that this assumption of the title of the metropolitanate testifies to the fact that sovereignty in Eastern Europe until the fifteenth century (Ivan III) was closely related to the metropolitanate. 43 The Byzantine concept which lay behind the use of the terms Major Rus' and Minor Rus' is a matter of conjecture. It is known that amongst the Greeks the metropolis or mother polis was denoted with the adjective tKpO'3 ("minor") in contradistinction to the colonies which were termed yEyag ("major," "great"), as, for example, "Magna Graecia" in reference to the Greek colonies in Southern Italy. An analogous situation exists with reference to the term "Asia Minor." This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the Lithuanian Prince Olgerd in 1354 referred to Kiev as "Mala Rus'."44
Under the influence of humanism the Greek term 'Pout'a (adopted by
Muscovy as a result of its interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654) came to be used among Kiev clergy in the fifteenth century and became prevalent in the Mohyla College in Kiev during the seventeenth century.45 The ancient name Roxolania also was used at that time with reference to the Ukrainian territories.46 There then developed the concept of three Rosiia's: the Major Rosiia, the Minor Rosiia, and the White Rosiia (as in the Synopsis). Under the influence of these ideas of the Mohyla College the Muscovite tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, after the conclusion of the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, changed his official title from tsar "of all Rusiia" (vseia Rusii) to "of all Great and Little and White Rosiia" (vseia Velikiia i Malyia i Belyia Rosii).47 This change, effected in 1655, elicited considerable opposition in European diplomatic circles at the time.48
The hetmans of the Ukrainian Cossack State prior to 1709 did at times designate the people of their territory-which they commonly As a result of the unhappy experience after the Pereiaslav Treaty, the hetmans endeavored to guard against the usurpation of the Ukrainian name in a foreign monarch's title. In the treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII there was a special provision dealing with this matter: "5. L'on n'innovera rien a ce qui a et6 observe jusques a present au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine. S.M.R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger cc Titre ni les Armes." Philippe Orlik, Deduction des droits de l'Ukraine (see note 34), p. 11. 49 See <<lnciEmo OpJIHa CTeOaHy HBOpCROMy,>> Ocuo6a, JHCTOTHaAb, 1862, pp. 13-14. 50 B. Ci'IlHlC1RI1I, Ha3ca Ympainu (Augsburg, 1948), p. 22. It was only after the uprising led by Mazepa that Peter I changed the title of "vseia Velikiia Malyia i Belyia Rossii Samoderzhets" (quoted for the last time in a document on Nov. 1, 1708, in HoAzoe co6pauue 3anoUO6 Poccuuicnouil Hnepuu (1830), IV, 424, to the new form of "samoderzhets Vserossiiskii," which was used for the first time in the Gramota malorossiiskomu narodu of Nov. 9, 1708. Ibid., IV, 426. Ukrainians. Malorossiia when employed by the Russians, especially in the nineteenth century, was felt by the Ukrainians to be derogatory.
The term Ukraina in the Kiev (twelfth century) and Galician-Volhynian (thirteenth century) Chronicles is used in a general sense to refer to "country" or "borderlands" (1187, 1189, 1213, 1268, 1280, 1282 ). In the sixteenth century Ukraina was used as a more specialized geographic term to refer to the Middle Dnieper region; accounts of the period refer to the inhabitants of the territory as "Ukrainians." The prominent polemicist Meletius Smnotrytsky (1587-1633) in enumerating in his Verificacia the various Rus' (Ukrainian and White Ruthenian) "tribes" in the Polish State mentions the Volhynians, Podolians, Ukrainians, and others.
Since the Middle Dnieper region became at that time the center of Ukrainian Cossackdom (the town Cossacks as distinct from thie Zaporozhians) they came to be called "Ukrainian" in a manner comparable to the Russian practice of calling both the urban and Zaporozhian Cossacks Cherkasy after the city of the same name. The term Ukraina became intimately associated with the Ukrainian Cossacks. They began calling the Ukraine their "mother" and "fatherland," and some of the hetmans and even colonels of the Zaporozhian Host even used the term in their titles.51
As the Cossack movement broadened, the term Ukraina was extended to all lands embraced by the movement. Ukraina quac est terra Cosaccorum or l'Ukraine ot Pays de Cosaques of the Western authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not only the name of the territory but designates the relation of the land to the people inhabiting it.52 This meaning of the term "Ukraine" penetrated the masses.
The population of the Ukrainian lands did not experience any general emotional uplift either in the Kiev Rus' or in the Galician-Volhynian Rus'. The wars with the Polovtsy never had an "all-national" character. In addition, the Polovtsy, like the Poles and Magyars and other peoples, were an inseparable part of the princely Rus'; war was waged against thenm one day, and the following day they became allies in a military campaign of one Rus' prince against another.
The Khmelnytsky Era elicited an emotional upheaval of a kind never before experienced by the Ukrainian masses; this elemental force, misled by demagogues in foreign service after Khmelnytsky's death, was more destructive than creative (especially during the Rutina, 1663-74), but it aroused an individual and collective feeling which was to leave an indelible mark. The Ukrainian masses idealized Khnmelnytsky's struggle against the "Polish lords" and yearned for this "Ukraine"--a utopian state of ideal Cossack freedom. Hence it is not surprising that after the term Malorossiia became discredited (because it had become a symbol of the colonial policies of the Russian state after 1709), the son1 of the people, Taras Shevchenko, associated his great talent not with the name Malorossiia but with Ukraina and thus resolved the question of what his people should be called.
STAGES AND THE DIALECTIC
The process by which the Ukrainian national movement acquired a political character can be understood more readily in terms of certaini aspects of the dialectic. Its emergence occurred in spite of its having been consigned (prematurely) to the historical archives and written off as a "lost cause." What began as an apolitical and cultural movement was transformed into a political phenomenon, although few of its earlier nineteenth-century proponents had this as their professed goal. The movement developed in a series of stages, each of which often gave the appearance of being self-contained and inconsequential but actually contained the seeds of further development and provided the basis for the following stage. A series of official policies designed to keep the Ukrainian masses helpless, voiceless, and submerged gave the appearance of being very effective in the nineteenth century but in the end bred the very forces which these harsh measures were designed to eliminate entirely or render impotent.
If, as Rudnytsky suggests, the Ukrainian peasant masses were barely touched politically by the national movement prior to 1905, it is hardly surprising in view of their inertia and benighted condition as serfs prior to 1861-thanks to Catherine II. In the period between the emancipation of the serfs and the 1905 Revolution, any political activity under the conditions of an autocratic monarchy could only be conspiratorial. The peasantry, in spite of its willingness to rebel sporadically, was hardly qualified for sustained political activity. Indeed, it is surprising, that some of them were able to participate in the First and Second Dumas and defend Ukrainian rights in spite of Russian efforts to destroy Ukrainian national identity in the name of an artificial "AllRussian" nation.53 This vain effort embraced a wide range of policies and techniques.
The attempts to outlaw the use of the Ukrainian language in print began as early as 1720, when Peter I forbade publication of all books except those dealing with religious matters, and these had to be verified wvith the Russian texts.54 The need for more effective measures led to Interior Minister Peter Valuev's secret circular of July 20, 1863, prohibiting publication of Ukrainian scholarly and popular books except for belles-lettres. The Ems Decree of Alexander II (May 18, 1876) forb)ade the importation of Ukrainian publications from the Western Ukraine, which was under Austrian rule, and permitted only historical works and belles-lettres to be published by Ukrainians living under Russian rule (on the condition that Russian orthography be used) and forbade theatrical productions and publication of Ukrainian folk songs and lyrics. Other techniques for denationalizing Ukrainians included the development and propagation of a distorted "All-Russian" historiography centered on Muscovy and claiming the Kiev Principality as the cradle of the Russian state. The official use of the term "Little Russian" served to create an invidious effect. The absence of public Ukrainian-language schools retarded the emergence of a national intelligentsia, although it could not deprive the Ukrainian masses of their native tongue in daily life.
A most damaging technique, though one which failed in the elnd, was that of corrupting the Ukrainian upper classes with titles, rewards, estates, and serfs in return for their joining the ranks of the "AllRussian" nation. This process resulted in formidable losses for the Ukrainians and gains for the Russians. Thus the composers Maxim Berezovsky and D. S. Bortniansky were appropriated by Russian music; Bortniansky was taken from the Ukraine in 1759 at the age of eight to sing in the choir of the royal court. Feofan Prokopovich and Stefan lavorsky, alumni of the Kiev Mohyla-Mazepa Academy, were induced by Peter I to come to Russia and aid in implementing his reforms; these two Ukrainians, whose names symbolize this phenomenon, made tiheir not inconsiderable talents available to the monarch and in return received high ecclesiastical office.55 This willingness to serve resulted, in part, from the fact that Muscovy in 1685 had succeeded in obtaining the approval of the patriarch of Constantinople for its annexation of the Kiev metropolitanate, which had been within the Constantinople jutrisdiction before that time.
The Petrine practice of recruiting talented foreign personnel wherever it could be found was a vital aspect of the creation of an "imperial culture" embracing various nationalities. For those recruited to serve this empire it was easy to identify with a larger integrating unit-one which enjoyed success and which, to its instruments, represented a new and "higher" development. If certain of the Ukrainian higher clergy played a role here, it was because they had been educated abroad and were indispensable to Peter I in his efforts to Europeanize Muscovy at a time when the less educated Russian clergy were resisting reform. The Ukrainian higher clergy were also attracted to this service early in the eighteenth century by the prospect of enjoying the support of a very firm political authority-something which was lacking in the Ukraine at times. Rudnytsky's tripartite periodization of the development of the Ukrainian national movement (in terms of the ages represented by the nobility, populism, and modernism) is useful, but it does not reveal fully the range of contradictory forces which shaped the movement. To appreciate the distinctiveness of each and to understand their mutual relationship it is necessary to distinguish between at least five stages.
The first stage might be called the Novhorod-Siversk stage, after the region in the northern part of the Left Bank in which the Istoriia Rusov was apparently written. The author of this unique work cannot be identified with absolute certainty, but it is clear that he was a member of the Ukrainian gentry, a man of considerable erudition who wrote with wit and sarcasm.56 The Istoriia Rusov, a historico-political tract disguised as a chronicle, was written in the late eighteenth or very early nineteenth century in a language close to the literary Russian of the time but abounding in purely Ukrainian expressions and proverbs.57 The work first circulated in manuscript form among the Left Bank gentry and was not published until 1846. It traces Ukrainian history back to the princely period and stresses the earlier ties with Lithuania and Poland but deals primarily with the Ukrainian Cossack State and with Khmelnytsky and Mazepa. The author is very critical of the MLiscovites and their mistreatment of the Ukrainians. He has Mazepa, in a speech, declare that Muscovy appropriated from the Ukrainians their ancient name of Rus'.58 In a speech attributed to Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, Peter I is referred to as a hangman and "Asiatic tyrant."59 Istoriia Rusov, in lamenting the fate of the Ukrainians, implied the right of each people to self-development free from foreign domination, but it also conveyed a certain feeling of resignation. Istoriia Rusov was far removed from the arid Synopsis of 1674 (earlier attributed to Innokentius Gizel). Thanks to its colorful style and its emphasis on the Cossack State, Istoriia Rntsov was to have an influence far beyond the narrowr circle within which it first circulated.
The second or Kharkov stage, originally centered on the Left Bank in the Poltava region, is characterized by the development of modern Ukrainian literature. Representatives of the gentry or persons associated with them decided to wsTrite in Ukrainian rather than in Russian. national equality should not obscure the Society's insistence (in verse 104-or 109 in the later enumeration) that "Ukraine will be an independent Republic (Rich Pospolita)." Quite clearly, the failure to achieve complete national equality would imply a solution outside a Slavic union. The arrangement advocated was not federalist in fact (though called that), because it did not provide for a Slavic central government but was more in the nature of a loose confederation. However, Kostomarov's Books of Genesis depicted the Ukrainians as willing to forgive Muscovy and Poland their depredations. Indeed, the Cyril and Methodians preached a benign kind of Ukrainian messianism with which the Books of Genesis concluded: "Then all peoples, pointing to the place on the map where the Ukraine will be delineated, will say: Behold the stone which the builders rejected has become the cornerstone."63 Thus the Ukrainians were to play a leading role in the projected Slavic union, since they were the least corrupted and most democratic Slavic people as a result of not having their own gentry (apart from those who were Russifled or Polonized) and of having suffered national oppression and foreign rule.
The suppression of the Cyril and Methodius Society in March, 1847, and the arrest of its members constituted an important turning point. Some, like Kostomarov, were frightened into conformity. The impact which this experience had on Taras Shevchenko was profound, and, as Rudnytsky points out, the poet's role as national prophet had consequences which were to be felt long after his death in 1861. In the midnineteenth century the Ukrainian movement was at a crucial juncture. Shevchenko's decision to write in the Ukrainian language and to combat tsarist Russian rule rather than accommodate himself to it meant that Ukrainian was to develop fully as a literary language and that the banner of national liberation was to have a worthy bearer.
Cultural Russification had by now become a very real threat. This had not been the case in the eighteenth century, because culturally the Russians had little to offer the Ukrainians at that time. The works of Kotliarevsky and Lomonosov could compete as exponents, respectively, of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, and Lomonosov even studied in Kiev. However, with the appearance of Pushkin and the full and rapid development of the Russian literary language the balance shifted in the nineteenth century to the detriment of Ukrainian. This is well illustrated in the case of Nikolai Gogol, who wrote in Russian as the leading representative of the "Ukrainian School" of Russian literature; however, his father, Vasyl Hohol'-Tanovsky (1780-1825), wrote in Ukrainian. Shevchenko's decision to devote his great talent to the preservation and enrichment of the Ukrainian language made possible the course of events which followed.
If there may be some uncertainty regarding where a dialect ends and an independent language commences, it is an indisputable fact that an independent literary language is not so much a linguistic as a cultural phenomenon. A prerequisite for an independent literary language is the creativity of a poet of genius who shapes the raw linguistic material into an instrument capable of conveying the most sensitive feelings and abstract ideas. This poet of genius who assured the existence of an independent Ukrainian literary language was-in the spirit of dialectical development-not a member of the gentry with a university education but the self-taught, redeemed serf, Taras Shevchenko. However, Shevchenko's role was not confined to literature. Relying upon the heritage of the three preceding stages (as exemplified in Istoriia Rusov, Kotliarevsky, and the Cyril and Methodius Society) and also upon the popular tradition and interpretation of the Ukrainian Cossack revolttion, Shevchenko created in fully developed poetic form not only the vision of an independent Ukraine (separate from Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia) but also the idea of an armed struggle for its attainment. 64 If prophets are not theologians, poets of genius are not political ideologists. Shevchenko's visions, which transcended the limited horizons of his contemporaries, could influence Ukrainian political thought only with the passage of time and the advent of appropriate conditions. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the Ukrainian movement limited to an apparently apolitical cultural Ukrainophilism. The Hromada (community) movement grew, emphasizing education in the Ukrainian language and love of the Ukrainian past and of the peasantry. The first such Hromada, formed among Ukrainians in St. Petersburg, published the journal Osnova in 1861-62 with the financial support of the Ukrainian gentry. The Hromada movement quickly spread to the Ukrainian cities and led to the fourth or Geneva stage, in which the Ukrainian movement acquired a clearly political character. This occurred as a result of the removal by Alexander II of Mykhailo Drahomanov from his professorship at the University of Kiev. Drahomanov went to Switzerland in 1876 and with the financial support of the Kiev Community began to publish Hromada, the first Ukrainian political journal, as well as brochures designed to develop Ukrainian political thought and to inform Europeans of Ukrainian problems and of the plight of his countrymen under Russian rule.65 He was the first to appreciate the true content and the political essence of Shevchenko's works and took the first steps to realize in political practice Shevchenko's poetic visions. Drahomanov's contribution was to insist that in the status of the Ukrainians has for an understanding of the intern-iational relations of East Central Europe.69
Rudnytsky has also exercised the historian's prerogative of confining his treatment to the events preceding 1917. This has enabled him to offer some important guideposts to an understanding of the origins and nature of Ukrainian claims, but has obscured somewhat the interplay of conflicting forces which has been at the heart of Ukrainian development. It is in the understanding of this contradictory process that the dialectic can be of use.
In addition to being characterized by struggle and the conflict of opposites, the Ukrainian movement has time and again led to the emergence of forces quite the opposite of those intended either by the movement's supporters or detractors. Thus the literati who wrote in Ukrainian early in the nineteenth century were loyal subjects of the tsar but unknowingly made possible the later political manifestations of nationalism. It was among the largely Russified Left Bank gentry that the movement had its modern origins; yet a class which gave every appearance of having been bought off by the Russian regime actually served an opposite purpose. Another example is provided by the Orthodox theological seminaries, which, though designed to serve as instruments of Russification, produced some of the leading exponents of Ukrainian nationalism as well as the clergy who affirmed the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1921. The Union of Brest (1596), unlike preceding efforts to this end, was brought about by Polish pressure on the Ukrainians, but the Ukrainian Catholic Church which resulted from it became an important means for preserving the nation and resisting Polish (and Russian) encroachments.
Nor has the post-1917 period been exempt from this dialectical process. The anti-Communist Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), led by Symon Petliura, was supposedly defeated, though it won a victory in compelling the Russians to abandon the practice of calling Ukrainians by the pejorative term "Little Russians" and to concede, at least in theory, that the Ukrainian SSR was "sovereign." The Ukrainian SSR, the UNR's most bitter antagonist, soon found itself compelled to defend Ukrainian rights. Khristian Rakovsky, who helped destroy Ukrainian sovereignty in 1919-20, became its advocate in 1922-23. Mykola Skrypnyk, Mykola Khvylovy, and other enemies of the UNR found it impossible to be loyal executors of policies made in Moscow.
There are numerous paradoxes and contradictions, not the least of which is that in spite of frequent Russian collective expressions of antipathy to manifestations of Ukrainian self-reliance, there have been individual Russians who have devoted themselves to the Ukrainian cause. Thus the historian Mme Efimenko was of Russian descent but
